Sassy Lawyer has what seems to be a rebuttal of my earlier post on the Constitutionality of distributing the Gloriagate tapes. She says:
What JJ Disini wants is for there to be a prior admission by Gloria Arroyo that it was her on the tape, that the conversation took place over the phone and, therefore, the only way that there can be a recording of the conversation is via wire taps. Darn, an admission is necessary to establish that the recording was done via wire taps? Common sense… if there were two people conversing, and each conversation was initiated with “hello”, and the voices of both parties were recorded, what can we deduce? That there were two parties recording the conversation from both ends and any tape combining what each said must have been doctored? Oh, come on.
I think she missed my point. First off I never said that and this “prior admission” business has no bearing on what I wrote. I wonder how she extrapolates that from my post.
All I said was that the government has no right to restrict the distribution of the tapes because the Constitution guarantees the freedom of the press and free speech. It is obvious that the government is trying to suppress discussion on the tapes by restricting access to the tapes. That’s an unconstitutional act. Sassy says it’s a criminal offense to distribute the tapes because of RA4200 but to the extent the law is being used to suppress free speech, it’s unconstitutional as applied. Remember that the Constitution says that no law shall be passed abridging free speech and the freedom of the press. “No law” means Congress did not (and was powerless to) intend RA4200 to apply in contravention of the Constitution.
But there’s more:
But “tend to assail” is not the same as categorical evidence of fraud. That’s like saying that Michael Jackson must have molested his accuser because he had committed acts in the past that “tended” to show he probably did it. The law punishes the commission or omission of specific acts, not the possibility or probability that a person may have committed the act. Tend to assail? Gee, can we draw a line here between what is and what probably is?
Again, the Sassy One is off the mark altogether. (Connie, are you doing this intentionally?) I also disagree with her assertion that because the tapes merely “tend to assail” the integrity of the 2004 Elections, they are somehow deficient because they do not constitute categorical evidence of fraud. She’s reading too much into what I wrote. I only wanted to establish that the tapes are a matter of public interest and therefore their distribution falls within that class of speech which is entitled to the highest form of protection, i.e., political speech. Under relevant case law, the state is not even permitted to impose prior constraints upon such speech.
I don’t think actual damage is necessary in this case to justify overlooking RA4200. When you consider that the right to suffrage and the integrity of our election system is at stake, then that goes to the very heart of a representative democracy. If that discussion can be restricted because of RA4200, then what sort of republic do we have — certainly not a deliberative one? No democracy can survive without a free discussion of issues affecting public interest. Besides, I’d like to ask what’s the legal basis for her position that “actual damage” is necessary to overlook RA4200? It’s not in RA4200 nor is it in the Constitution.
The only reason why some parties insist on dissemination, without the filing of proper charges, is because the tapes are a means to create a perception, instead of establishing facts.
Well, that’s a shoe that fits the other foot as well. If the government insists on protecting the tapes on the basis of RA4200 (especially when noone is claiming to be a victim), then it makes it possible for them to create contrary perceptions about the tapes themselves. So, restricting the tapes achieves the same ends as releasing them. But at least if the facts are before us, it is easier to refute one position and uphold another. Without them, then we’re truly in the dark.
This may not be a “strictly legal” argument in the Sassy Lawyer’s view even though it’s firmly grounded upon our highest law, the Constitution, whereas her position is based on a law which draws its authority from the Constitution. Which do you think is superior?
P.S. (Hit the submit button too soon) There are clear distinctions between freedom of expression, right to public information and freedom of the press.
I reiterate, Gloriagate is not a case for freedom of expression.
Posted by Sassy at June 21, 2005, 9:18 amI left a comment after yours below the linked article:
I tend to agree a lot more with JJ Disini's comment, and wanted to add some points:
1. That quote from Dan Mariano about public interest and privacy is stupid and misleading. The proper doctrine is that when a private person becomes intertwined in a matter of public interest, he becomes a public figure who faces a diminished expectation of privacy.
However, as every freshman law student knows, the right to privacy inheres in places and zones. Following the quote, there is no expectation of privacy in JJ Disini's bedroom if Constitutional Law is being discussed, but privacy "turns on" when the conversation shifts to earthier topics.
Stupid.
Not to mention that the privacy of communication is the only explicit mention of "privacy" in the Constitution.
2. How can the freedom of expression not be an issue if the government is restricting citizens' rights to disseminate this recording? To cite one angle, part of it is now an indispensable means of expressing dissatisfaction with the President. Thus, as JJ says, exercise your rights, download a ringtone.
I think it has come to the point where you can argue that if you can't play the ringtone (based on an ALLEGED wiretap that came from the Press Secretary), a significant chunk of your freedom to expression has just become inutile, RA 4200 or no.
3. I'm not so keen on "actual damage," and this sounds like a mixture of Constitutional and Civil Law. For one, damage is presumably incalculable whenever there is prior restraint of expression. For the Internet and telecommunications, Reno v. ACLU as far back as 1997 already depicted the vibrance of communication even in the early stages of the Internet.
For another, you can damage a public official or public figure to quite an extreme in the exercise of your freedom of speech before you are considered committing libel. According to law, it comes with the territory.
Those tapes of Marcos crooning to Dovie Beams are mentioned in the history books right?
4. Mentioning a taxpayer's suit similarly raises my eyebrows. First, there is no direct disbursement of taxpayer's money being talked about.
Second, there is no explicit prohibition in the Constitution related to such a disbursement being talked about.
Third, a taxpayer's suit is a way to justify standing in a Constitutional case. Where is the Constitutional issue?
Fourth, a taxpayer's suit will not make you a party to the electoral protest in the Supreme Court.
Fifth, it's very inconsistent to talk about "actual damage" in relation to the freedom of expression, but be blase about saying what taxpayer's money is directly involved in this proposed taxpayer's suit.
5. What's wrong with perceptions? Facts are nice and all, but democracy would be terribly boring without perceptions, emotions, polemics, satires, and the whole shebang.
I understand your desire for "truth," but freedom of expression protects even the most atrociously silly ideas.
6. JJ gets quoted now? Asenso a.
Boss,
Correct quote from Katz, but I note it's clarified by this further quote:
"[W]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own house or office, is not a subject [of]… protection, but what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
I was expressing disappointment at how Sassy dropped terms like "taxpayer's suit" without a reasonable context I can infer. I didn't understand "clear distinctions between freedom of expression, right to public information and freedom of the press" either.
Posted by Oscar at June 22, 2005, 8:27 pmForgot one thing, boss.
I think the case you want for your Constitution v. RA 4200 discussion is Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, featuring a petition by no less than Dean Pacifico Agabin in 2001, and a specific separate opinion by VV Mendoza.
The case supports both views, I think. You're saying (and I agree) that RA 4200 cannot be applied so broadly so as to restrict political speech (assuming the speakers are not absolutely certain yet those tapes came from wiretaps).
The counterpoint is VV Mendoza's argument that overbreadth doctrine does not apply to penal laws, which are precisely aimed at restricting certain conduct.
The counter-counterpoint is that replicating the Garci tapes (again, alleged to be from wiretaps) is in furtherance of political discussion and reaches into the very essence of the freedom of speech. Thus, RA 4200 cannot be applied to uphold a chilling effect.
Your take?
Posted by Oscar at June 22, 2005, 9:47 pmFr Bernas mentions the role of freesom of expression in the playing of the tapes in Congress.
http://news.inq7.net/opinion/index.php?index=2&story_id=41611&col=75…
"XXXFinally, we cannot discuss this matter without alluding to freedom of expression in general. The contents of the alleged wiretapped materials are not merely of private concern; they are matters of public interest. Even if they are the product of illegal wiretapping, there is good reason for allowing disclosure-as in fact they are already being disclosed by private parties. In the 1971 historic case of New York Times v. United States, New York Times won the right to publish stolen Pentagon Papers on the ground that the material was of great public concern. But what of privacy rights? Privacy concerns must give way when balanced against the interest in disseminating information of paramount public importance. Anyone who accepts public office also accepts an attendant loss of privacy. Jurisprudence is replete with assertions of democracy's "national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open.""
Posted by masha at June 27, 2005, 10:45 pmHi.
The issue may already be moot and academic, but I would just like to add another thing.
Isn't prior restraint of speech (or symbolic speech) valid if there is a clear and present danger to the country?
Dean Pangalangan gives the example of a man who yells fire while in the movie theater. He calls it classic. I call it unrealistic. You cannot restrain anyone from saying the word "fire" in a movie theater. Yelling is another thing however.
Clear and present does not mean immediate danger. It means precisely what it says, the presence of a concrete and easily identifiable danger. There need not be a 100% certainty that it will occur, there has to be a reasonablly strong possibilty though. Maybe 75%.
I am only worried that the airing of the tapes might inspire and foster more dissent and violence among rightist and leftist groups in the country. Already, militant groups are gearing up for the SONA and if there ever was a more politically sensitive issue in recent years, this is it. I don't know how much violence, death or destruction is needed to qualify "danger", but I do know that even just one occurence is one too many.
Posted by Rob at July 6, 2005, 11:15 pmAll comments are moderated. Your comments will not appear here unless approved by the blog owner. Thank you.
First off, I posted my entry in reaction to how you were wuoted by Dan Mariano in his column. If he quoted you out of context, res ipsa loquitur. Note that said columnist never provides links to the quoted portions to give the reader a chance to read the original writing in its orignal context. He did it to me too.
Reading too much into what you wrote? Nah, I do read between the lines, however. Better than literally interpreting anything.
As to your last question: Reason, of course.
Posted by Sassy at June 21, 2005, 9:02 am